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Abstract
　 People as moral agents are guided by moral principles, either by some intuitive and universal 
maxims or by culturally conditioned rules that they more or less consciously absorb and apply.  
While it is true that the goal of most human actions is the pursuit of meaning and good, it is also 
true that this good exists actually as and in a hierarchy of goods; it has to be discovered, 
interiorized and concretized by the very individual, and oftentimes there is more than one way to 
achieve it and maybe sometimes there is not any way to achieve the perfect good.  Many actions 
are led by “gut reactions” and commonsense principles rather than serious logical evaluation, 
however it is within the human capacity to reflect more deeply on moral reasoning and to 
approach ever closely the more perfect understanding of good.  Especially, it has to be reflected 
upon whether the greatest good is always to be done, whether some evil can be permitted in 
order to bring about a greater good or, even more importantly, whether evil as such can be object 
of a direct volitional action at all.  In this paper I claim that, although intuitively and in everyday 
usage the notion of “lesser evil” has a certain weight, theologically speaking it is unsustainable 
and nonsensical and can potentially be misunderstood or even misused.  Its application is quite 
limited, finding its place not in moral dilemmas but mostly in the realm of secular and social life.  
It is not a core principle of Christian ethics at all but rather a provisional way to escape 
immediately unresolvable situations.  This is the first of two parts.
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Introduction: Evil as a topic of modern reflection
　 Until modern times, there was not much interest in the topic of “evil” as such.  The existence 
of evil was more or less accepted and explained, for example as abuse of human freedom, as 
absence or corruption of good, as imperfection etc., even though it is something profoundly 
paradoxical and not easily explainable.  Although evil was not a constitutive part of being 
human, it was nonetheless a reality and humans were somehow responsible for it.  Evil was 
considered not to have been part of the original human nature, and therefore the goal of 
redemption should have been a state wherein there is no more evil.  As a topic, it was admitted 
yet it was rarely worth dealing with at length, and if then always only in connection with the 
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good.  In modernity, things changed radically, that is to say, evil is not taken seriously enough 
for one of two reasons.  First, because human nature came to be considered essentially and 
necessarily good (and only eventually corrupted by society), making a person virtually unable 
to commit a serious personal evil.  Or, second, evil tendencies are a consequence of somebody’s 
sin or of objective sinful inclinations, but they are reducible to biological, genetic and social 
influences and as such are to a certain extent unavoidable (and therefore non-culpable).  At a 
closer look, we can see that the old theme of gnosticism in its various shapes comes up again 
and again with the intent of blaming God, the matter, fate, or anything else for any experienced 
evil, accepting rather than questioning evil’s presence.  Later, in existentialist thought, evil will 
be emphasized as a proof of the non-existence of God, however, in this case, the meaning of the 
word is patently reduced to “physical evil”.  The unanswered question is why the human will, 
which is created as oriented towards the good, can freely not choose the good ― either missing 
its target or failing at achieving it from the very start.
　 A theoretically groundbreaking approach that thematized evil was taken by I.  Kant who was 
interested in what he called “radical evil”.1  His sound intuition made it clear that evil deeds do 
not depend completely on human decision led by a totally free and indifferent will, or in other 
words, not every single evil action is a product of an explicitly bad intention.  Moreover, the 
inclination or propulsion (Ger. Hang) towards evil is indelibly inscribed in the human nature, so 
that it can be called radical (from “having roots in it”), being all-encompassing and stronger 
than the acting person herself.  There is a force previous to every intention that makes humans 
commit evil acts more easily than they do good ones.  Nevertheless, there is in Kant’s 
pessimistic thought also a pre-disposition towards good, but humans often experience the 
reality of willing the good, while mistakenly wishing something contrary to it in the end.  The 
way through this labyrinth is to be found in not relying ingenuously upon one’s inclinations but 
by finding a sound law that sets up clear duties for that person’s adherence.  The question 
about the origins of evil in human nature ― originally created as good and therefore potentially 
good even now ― can be traced to early Christian writers and their notion of mysterium 
iniquitatis (cf. 2 Thess 2: 7).  According to this notion, the wickedness, which is at work inside 
creation, is profoundly a mystery and it is not enough to seek to explain it only rationally. 
Without sufficient grace, the will is trapped in aiming at what it knows to be good but at the 
same time not being able to attain it autonomously in a perfect way.2
　 Another interesting modern approach worth mentioning is the well-known H. Arendt’s 
reflection on the so-called “banality of evil”.3  According to the Jewish philosopher, we can see 
in history as well as in the present environment many objectively evil deeds, brutal actions, 
1 I. KANT,  Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793); cf. K. JASPERS,  Rechenschaft und Ausblick: Reden 
und Aufsätze , Piper: München, 1951; cf. K. JASPERS, “Das radikal Böse bei Kant,” in:  Aneignung und Polemik. Gesammelte 
Reden und Aufsätze zur Geschichte der Philosophie , H. Saner  ― R. Piper & Co. Verlag: München, 1968.
2 On the topic of autonomy and evil, cf. M. COECKELBERGH, ’Can We Choose Evil? A Discussion of the Problem of Radical 
Evil as a Modern and Ancient Problem of Freedom’, in: D. E. Keen  ― P. Rossi Keen (eds.),  Considering Evil and Human 
Wickedness , Inter-Disciplinary Press: Oxford, 2004, 339 ― 353.
3 H. ARENDT,  Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil , The Viking Press: New York, 1963.
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atrocities that cannot but be criticized and refused.  But at a closer look, one surprisingly 
realizes that these deeds are not done by beasts or devil’s incarnations at all, but instead by 
ordinary people who usually are good and live well under normal conditions.  In some sense, 
the most corrupted actions possible done by the worst of humans with a clearly bad intention 
can be understood or at least logically explained, if not accepted.  On the contrary, the violence 
accomplished by ordinary people, who otherwise may be virtuous persons in the rest of their 
lives, perhaps even without an explicitly evil intention, is a mystery not easily explorable 
philosophically.  The paradoxical insight of Arendt and others was that, while good cannot be 
accomplished accidentally and without direct will and endeavor, evil can be apparently done 
much more easily, without even being convinced of what one is doing.  Translated to a more 
traditional spiritual vocabulary, a great sinner who is well aware and proud of consciously doing 
evil is usually more easily convinced to repent and convert than a mediocre believer who is 
hardly aware of his or her lukewarmness and commits evil (or rather omits much good) in vain, 
so to speak.  It is a lasting memento of this account that in other circumstances perhaps any 
other person, who now criticizes evil, could end up going the same way.
　 The third modern approach to the topic of evil was the debate over “intrinsically evil” acts in 
the late 20th century.  Since evil is not a dualistic co-principle of the good that would be 
necessarily present in every action to a greater or lesser extent (and, according to some, even 
in God himself), but rather an absolute negation/privation of good that does not simply become 
such in certain circumstances or only because of particular intentions, it follows that there 
might be cases in which a deed is always and everywhere evil.  Thus, it is quite easy for an 
action to be completely evil, at least in theory, whereas goodness is something to be striven for 
and maybe totally unreachable in most cases.  However, as much as this principle might sound 
valid, to determine which acts apply to it is another and a more delicate question, because 
people might act objectively in similar ways but with completely different awareness of their 
actions.  Traditionally, Catholic moral theology has considered intrinsice malum acts as lying, 
fornication or murder, although it has to be added that not every killing is defined as murder 
straightaway, nor does every removal of the fetus qualify as abortion.  The fact that death of 
innocents cannot be sometimes avoided does not prove at all the thesis that there are no moral 
absolutes or that it should be allowed in all similar cases.  On the contrary, that the unjust 
killing of an innocent being is always gravely wrong is one such valid norm.  The point here is 
that the responsibility towards an essentially evil act can diminish (as in the case of 
masturbation) according to the degree of developmental stage or dependency maybe up to the 
state of direct personal non-culpability, but such acts will never turn good and meritorious only 
because unavoidable.4  Another disputed case could be contraception, which according to some 
is really intrinsically evil when used as a contraception but can be at least morally neutral when 
used in a different way, i.e. with a different intention which would constitute it as a different 
4 As will be said later, even acts done in accordance with one’s own invincibly erroneous conscience are, at least 
Thomistically, not considered sinful but rather obligatory, but that does not make them good or virtuous. Calling such 
acts, committed out of necessity or ignorance, virtuous is more akin to the voluntarism of William of Ockham.
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“moral object” - even if it has a contraceptive by-effect.5  The sinfulness of all other evil acts, on 
the other hand, consists only in disordered love for an inherently good object or in abusing a 
good object for wrong or at least excessive purposes.
　 Finally, there is another adjective connected with “evil” in recent moral thought.  According 
to the interpretation of Romano Guardini (1885―1968), who will be mentioned again below, evil 
cannot be an attribute of being.  In his words, evil is something “superfluous” that does not 
have the right to exist.6  It does not in any case mean that evil is an illusion, since Guardini was 
aware of its reality and power.  He wanted to point out that evil not only is a corruption of an 
originally good being, but that it ― as a consequence ― is a non-necessary thing and has no 
place in the order of creation.  To be evil does not express that something is prohibited or may 
not be committed, but rather that something must not exist or should have not existed as such. 
If that is true, evil cannot become a value to be directly pursued.  The problem is that the 
human capacity of seeing what is good and of discerning is weakened and, therefore, there are 
only two unfortunate and extreme possibilities to choose evil as such: as result of a deception, 
something that has been mistakenly considered good, or on the other hand a pathological and 
diabolic tendency towards nothingness, longing for non-being or an open enmity towards God.7 
In any case, good and evil do not stand on the same level, and neither do the choices of good 
and evil.  Guardini stresses non-dualistically that evil always depends in its being on the good 
that it mimics and on which it parasitizes.  Evil is not co-original with good and it will not be the 
ultimate reality either.  Furthermore, their characteristic as “contraries” (Widersprüche rather 
than Gegensätze) is to exclude each other mutually.
　 The notion latent in modern considerations is often that the human condition in its present 
state exists as if the human person had to be evil to some extent, or as if humans could not help 
5 Cf. M. RHONHEIMER, “The Truth About Condoms,”  Tablet (July 10, 2004): 11. The concept of intrinsically evil acts was 
notoriously codified in encyclicals such as  Humanae vitae (§14) or  Veritatis splendor (§80 ― 81), although having roots 
in scholastic theology. It does not mean that every intrinsically evil act equals a grave sin, nor does it exclude from 
evaluation the other two “sources of morality”  ― intention (the end sought) and circumstances. It simply (if that is the 
right term) states that some goods are so profoundly important that they cannot be reasonably intended as material 
object for an act with which they do not have an essential bond.
6 Cf. R. GUARDINI,  Welt und Person , 50;  Das Christusbild , 140;  Freiheit, Gnade, Schicksal , 127 fn.;  Theologische Briefe an 
einen Freund , 11.
7 Let me quote just one passage from Guardini’s  Ethik , 83. “ Durch die ganze abendländische Geschichte zieht sich der 
Satanismus, in welchem der Mensch sich Satan verpflichtet. Je deutlicher von Christus her sich das Heilige enthüllt, desto 
größer wird die Versuchung, das Böse als solches zu wollen; an ihm die heftigste Lust zu finden; es zur Herrschaft zu 
bringen und zu triumphieren. Abgesehen vom pathologischen Charakter solcher Gestalten tritt aber gerade in ihnen die 
Negativität des Bösen in einer geradezu grausigen Art hervor. Diese Menschen wollen nichts, was ist, was angeredet 
werden kann, was Freude weckt und schaf ft. Ihr Leben ist leer. Es hat den Charakter der Verzweiflung, die sich, je 
nachdem, als ein Toben und Wüten, oder als ein Zerstören, oder als Wesenlosigkeit und Kälte ausdrückt. Das als solches 
gewollte Böse ist leer und sinnlos. Die vernichtendste Offenbarung über das Böse im Gericht wird wohl darin bestehen, daß 
es sich als das vollkommen Überflüssige enthüllt. ”
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committing evil.8  It seems that humanity is still in its second stage, in Augustinian terms, about 
which it could be said only that it “non potest non peccare”.9  However, the effects of redemption 
should become visible, at least partially, and therefore for Augustine present humanity is also 
potentially able not to sin (posse non peccare), while heading toward a stage of not even being 
able to commit any evil.  In this tradition, good means to participate in the goodness of God, 
and that is possible gradually and can be only anticipated to some extent.  It is indeed true that 
sometimes humans cannot do as much good as they ideally would like to, but does evil take 
necessarily part in our present lives? For that reason or another, people often make evil an 
object of their decisions, but the question is whether choosing a good freely and consenting to 
an evil regretfully are the same kind of operation.  In this paper I am going to argue the 
contrary.  I aim to reconsider the meaning of the well-known axiom about choosing the “lesser 
evil” that is often used unconsciously and even incorrectly, as if it were bringing about a kind of 
more or less good action.  Before addressing this issue, we will do well to examine the 
Thomistic notion of the object of choice that has always to be some good in order to be literally 
free.
1. Can evil be an independent object of choice?
　 In the Christian tradition, which is often a deduction from more universal natural-law 
principles and their affirmation and extension, it has been admitted that it is always good that 
must be done and evil that should be avoided (bona sunt eligenda, mala vitanda).10  Rational 
reflection over this so-called “first principle of practical reason” grasped almost intuitively by 
conscience (synderesis) arrived at the conclusion that only a good can be really aimed at, that is, 
only a positive good with a subjective validity can be intended and chosen, whereas evil actions 
always have a partial or an alleged good as their object.  In this way of thinking we can see the 
Christian optimism concerning human nature.  In other words, even if the intellect is damaged 
by sin, it is still able to recognize goods to which it inclines by nature, only that in some cases it 
mistakes an evil for a good, thus maintaining still a good intention.  Such an action can even be 
considered subjectively a right one, if done in accordance with one’s conscience - inevitably
8 Cf. G. L. MURPHY, “Necessary Natural Evil and Inevitable Moral Evil”, in  Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith , vol. 
68/2, June 2016, 111 ― 118. The author does not deal so much with committing moral evils as with the origin of 
possibilities for evil in the physical and moral order. Talking from a protestant perspective, he claims that much of evil 
in the world is inevitable but not necessary, because that would make God responsible even for sinful actions. Our 
contingent and fallen condition makes us susceptible of wrongful acting, but evil behavior is not hardwired in human 
genes. Anyway, the goal is not to live according to this present condition but to undergo  gradually a new creation by 
God where evil has no place anymore.
9 Cf. AUGUSTINE,  On Correction and Grace , XXXIII;  Enchiridion , ch. 118.
10 For biblical instantiations of this principle see Ps 34: 15, 37: 27, cf. 1Pt 3: 11.
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erroneous.11  In any case, only good - with which the humans are in some way related ― can be 
a sufficient reason for beginning a really free action.  Perceiving something as good is the first 
condition for the will, moved by reason, to pursue it.
　 The representative of such a reasoning is definitely Thomas Aquinas.  For him, due to the 
flawed functioning of reason, even evil is regrettably chosen as any other thing but only and 
always “sub ratione boni,” while the object of every action is something that has been known 
and that is being willed, based on previous knowledge, as good.  Knowing a good as a good 
would make the human agent tend towards it almost automatically.  On the other hand, evil as 
such cannot really be willed.  In Thomas’ words:
[...] dicendum quod malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni, scilicet inquantum est secundum quid 
bonum, et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum.  Et sic aliquis amor est malus, inquantum tendit in id quod 
non est simpliciter verum bonum.  Et per hunc modum homo diligit iniquitatem, inquantum per iniquitatem 
adipiscitur aliquod bonum, puta delectationem vel pecuniam vel aliquid huiusmodi.12
Willing an evil intentionally would mean contradicting one’s own nature, which for all humans 
means desiring good ― whatever that means ― above all knowledge and truth, happiness and 
beatitude, as well as preservation and propagation of life and life in society.  Of course, what 
these applications of the principle of practical reason in the broadest sense actually mean has to 
be further specified.  However, aiming at an evil (albeit a lesser one) is and remains for Thomas 
a paradox,13 since the only real end of an action not only is but must necessarily be a good, and 
a good intention in itself is never sufficient to make any action good.  As we will see, the crucial 
notion is that of freedom.  Unlike the modern understanding of freedom as license, for Aquinas 
11 Cf. Thomas AQUINAS,  Summa Theologiae , I ― II, q. 19 a. 5 ― 6. The point is that conscience always retains its binding 
function, but only in the case of involuntary and invincible error does it excuse from sin.  In fact, in this case the will 
obeys the judgment of the reason which mistakes an evil for a good, therefore, subjectively it is pursuing a good. “But 
if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be 
involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience excuses the will, that abides by that erring reason, from being evil 
(a. 6 co., quoted according to https://aquinas.cc [accessed 28 July 2020]).” Even in this case, though, the resulting act 
is not to be called simply “good” but rather “not sinful.”
12 Thomas AQUINAS,  Summa Theologiae , I ― II, q. 27, a. 1 ad 1 (Latin quotations are according to  Corpus thomisticum , http://
www.corpusthomisticum.org [accessed 19 August 2017]).  English translation: “Evil is never loved except under the 
aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is considered as being good simply.  And thus a 
certain love is evil, in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good.  It is in this way that man ’loves iniquity,’ 
inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or such like” (quoted 
according to https://aquinas.cc [accessed 23 June 2020]).
13 Cf. G. PINE, “The Incipient Probabilism of Francisco de Vitoria,”  Nova et Vetera 17 (3/2019): 717 ― 746. “The unity of the 
moral life as envisioned by St. Thomas forbids this type of moral tragedy [of choosing licitly between two evils, for 
example between a moral and a venial sin].  Evil cannot be the object of a human act except when perceived as an 
apparent good.  Only good (or the appearance thereof) motivates appetite.  There are grounds for arguing here that, in 
Vitoria’s understanding, it is the object as  comparatively less-evil which engages the moral agent” (743 ― 744).
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freedom consists not in choosing without constraints but in choosing what is right and true, in 
accordance with one’s nature, and what is perfective of the true life of the person.  Hence, the 
freedom of choice does not depend on the number of alternatives.  And sometimes, despite 
good will, there is nothing that can possibly be chosen as a matter to act upon.
　 The reason why evil cannot be pursued as an end lies in Thomas’ profoundly Augustinian 
conviction that evil is ultimately a non-being.  Evil is nothing less than a “privatio boni”, rather 
than its simple lack or absence.  Evil is a degradation of an originally good entity, but now 
competing with or replacing a real existing good or goods.  If seen in its real nature, there is no 
rational reason to choose an evil, since according to Aquinas, for every choice there has to be a 
(at least implicit) reason.  In other words, pertaining to evil there is nothing that could be loved, 
and without the love for an object, the human person is incapable of its pursuit.  Even hatred for 
evil is only the negative side of love for the good and can never operate on its own.  Evil, 
however small, must never be intended, or better, cannot by definition be directly chosen.  The 
radicality of this Thomistic view can be seen in the conclusion he draws from it in the field of 
law theory: an evil cannot be ordered even by authority (not even by God, which would be 
absurd) and a wicked law loses its very force to bind in conscience.  Not because it loses its 
effectivity as a law but because it ceases to be a law.14
　 Thus, for Thomas, coherence with one’s own ultimate end and obedience to just laws 
(expressing the will of God) count as much as the right intention that can change the moral 
value of acts, which otherwise would not be object of any discussion.  Doing good things ― like 
almsgiving ― for wretched reasons corrupts the whole action despite its potential good effects. 
To sum up, choosing a real evil known as evil would be a contradiction and betrayal of one’s 
natural inclination towards good (that has been diminished but not wiped away by the sin), and 
rather than calling it immediately diabolic we can at most suppose that there is a problem in 
cognition.  Indeed, in many cases people do choose evil objects but simply because they are 
mistakenly recognized as apparent goods.  What has been perceived as good is not always a 
real good.  In that sense, for something being good both things are necessary ― that the object 
be intended (an act done by chance, mistake or for other purpose would not be good) and that 
it be subjectively known as good (on the other hand, it does not mean that everything people 
find good must be good in reality, although the more people agree in goodness of some 
fundamental acts the higher chance there is that their acts are actually good).
14 Cf.  Summa Theologiae , I ― II, q. 96 a. 4. This axiom is of Augustinian origin and a quotation from Augustine.
186 Evil as Object of a Deliberate Action (Part 1)
　 From the biblical point of view, if it is true that it is not licit to use any evil means in order to 
achieve a good (cf. Rom 3: 8),15 it seems possible to affirm that a (lesser) evil should not be 
directly used in order to avoid a greater evil.  But can avoiding a greater evil be called a good? 
Not doing that good which one is capable of doing certainly means an omission and sin (cf. Jas 
4: 14), however, following from that does not directly infer that not avoiding every possible evil 
becomes a sin.  Note that the verbs used for good and evil are “do” and “avoid” respectively, the 
real direct object of striving being only a good.16  In any case, the evil has to be “escaped”, 
which is far from a possibility to “love” evil though in some corrupted way.  Biblically, evil is not 
supposed to be chosen even as a revenge towards another evil, nor as an instrument to combat 
it (cf. Rom 12: 17, 1 Thess 5: 15; 1 Pt 3: 9).  Christians are called not to oppose evil per se, but 
rather to overcome evil positively by good (cf. Mt 5: 39).  The whole world is considered to be 
in the power of evil (cf. 1 Jn 5: 19), but Christians are conscious of not being from this world 
while at the same time remaining in it.  Reflecting on the original plan of creation, we can thus 
suppose that humans were not to know evil at all, which is why the capacity for evil should 
never have become part of the human nature.  However, as a result of corruption, the present 
human condition involves the everyday confusion or perplexity of one who has intention to do 
good but nonetheless finds himself or herself doing what is evil, more or less voluntarily but 
15 This fundamental principle is called by some “the Pauline principle,” although certainly touching on slightly different 
matters in a different context, and can be amplified to the whole area of Christian ethics (cf. N. TONTI-FILIPPINI,  About 
Bioethics: Philosophical and Theological Approaches , Connor Court Publishing: Ballan, 2011, especially pp. 53 ― 54). 
However, there are others who do not hesitate to call it “a faulty reading” as supported by this biblical passage, without 
even stating reasons for such a view (J. SELLING,  Reframing Catholic Theological Ethics , Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2016, 183 fn. 20).  The former view is documented in the thought of Aquinas in several places ( De veritate , q. 5 a. 4 arg. 
10;  De malo , q. 15 a. 1 arg. 5;  De decem praeceptis , a. 1 co., etc.).  In other words, whatever the original biblical context, 
the later tradition has undoubtedly interpreted Rom 3: 8 in the sense that no moral evil is to be done so as to cause 
some good.  At least for Thomas, intention alone does not excuse an evil and it is at least not in humans’ power to draw 
consciously good from evil.  Just to add some Thomas’ positions, in the order of appearance quoted above: “ Dicendum, 
quod facere malum, ut ex dictis patet, nullo modo bonis competit; unde facere malum propter bonum in homine 
reprehensibile est nec Deo potest attribui.  Sed ordinare malum in bonum, hoc non contrariatur bonitati alicuius; et ideo 
permittere malum propter aliquod bonum inde eliciendum, Deo attribuitur ” (therefore, evil can in some sense be part of 
God’s providence); “ Ille Commentator in hoc non est sustinendus: pro nulla enim utilitate debet aliquis adulterium 
committere, sicut nec mendacium dicere debet aliquis propter utilitatem aliquam, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. contra 
mendacium ” (here, speaking of someone’s view that fornication with a tyrant’s wife can be good if it helps liberating the 
country from the tyrant’s oppression, Thomas does not hesitate to affirm that the commentator [Averroes?] is 
mistaken and not to be followed); and finally, “ Unde nullum malum bona intentione factum excusatur.  Rom. III, 8: qui 
dicunt, faciamus mala ut veniant bona: quorum damnatio iusta est.  Tunc autem adest bona voluntas intentioni, quando 
ipsa voluntas voluntati divinae concordat; quod quotidie postulamus dicentes: fiat voluntas tua... ” (all Latin quotations are 
from https://www.corpusthomisticum.org [accessed 23 June 2020]; English translation is not available to me at the 
moment).
16 Cf. Gal 9: 9. Moreover, 1Thess 5: 22 speaks quite radically of “refraining from evil in every its form”, that is, of refuting 
even an appearance of evil, which in fact could be some good.
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never intentionally (cf. Rom 7).  Evil occurs and it is nearly impossible to avoid or reduce it 
completely, hence, it should not be considered a duty to eliminate every evil in the world at any 
cost as far as the present world exists.  Moreover, in this view, the presence of evil that can be 
reduced or avoided is not a condition of possibility for good.  That is to say, good can be done 
without evil alternatives and that is why in heaven there can and there will be good too and only 
good.
　 However, there is another tradition apart from the Thomistic one, that has deep roots in the 
present mentality, i.e.  Ockhamist voluntarism with its nominalistic reasoning.  According to it, 
the meaning of freedom is that a person can (not may!) positively choose whatever she wants, 
no matter if it is evil or good.  In this reasoning, for an action to be free there must be always 
another option at one’s disposal, that is at least the contrary one.  Having before oneself evil 
and good, a free person would not be attracted by any one of them more than by the other and 
only then would she be free to choose between them and the choice could be, thus, called 
meritorious.  And because none of them causes a stronger attraction toward it, the human will 
has to be directed by a law, as Kant will later have it.  We cannot agree on this limitless and 
omnipotent understanding of freedom, called by S. Pinckaers rightly “the freedom of 
indifference”,17 but there is one right point of view in it ― humans are also free not to choose 
(not so much vis-à-vis a good, but moreover when there is no good), which is indeed already a 
choice.  The quality of being lesser does not constitute in evil the reason for the agent to be 
attracted by it.  In fact, the freedom actualized in choosing good and the freedom practiced (or 
better, abused) in choosing evil are not the same thing ― one is easy and joyful, while the other 
is infantile.  Another point worth highlighting is that the real freedom, as analyzed by Aquinas 
contrary to Ockham,18 exercised in every good action becomes more and more pleasurable and 
easier with every next deed that has good as its object, rather than being a one-time choice.  At 
the same time, tending easily towards evil is also possible and real, yet not as a normal 
exercising of the faculty of the will but rather unnatural to it.  It is true that there are choices in 
which an objective evil gets chosen ― either as an apparent good willed by an erroneous 
conscience or by force of necessity or coercion ― in which case it has nothing lovable in itself. 
17 S. PINCKAERS,  The Sources of Christian Ethics , transl.  Mary T. Noble, The Catholic University of America Press: 
Washington D.C., 1995 3 [orig. 1985], especially p. 375 (comparative table).  According to him, humans are really free 
only in pursuing good, and that is why the real freedom (i.e. freedom for excellence) in Thomistic terms has to grow 
with every good action.  On the contrary, choosing evil for any reason means only abusing of the freedom or illusory/
self-deceptive freedom.  It is preeminently a modern notion that the “autonomy” of the person enables her to choose 
equally good as well as evil, as if she could realize herself in any choice.
18 The rationale behind his view seems to be this: since freedom precedes every act rather than arises in the act itself (as 
Thomas would have it), we have to be able and allowed to practice it.  That is almost the same as to say, in order to be 
free beings  ― which we are  ― we have to exercise freedom in every act and that is why we steadily have to choose. 
Humans, in Ockham, become and remain themselves through choosing, especially that towards which they are not 
inclined (otherwise no freedom was needed).  Then if there happen to be two evils, one of which is more strictly 
prohibited, the person is left with the right (or even duty) to choose the lesser one, rather than refrain from choice, no 
matter that this particular choice would not contribute to nor perfect the nature of the agent.
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Differently from Ockham, it seems more reasonable to call such acts with Aquinas bad yet “not 
sinful”, but that does not equal calling them neutral, let alone virtuous.  There are wrongs that 
cannot be justified, yet which subjectively do not constitute sins in that particular case. 
Nevertheless, that does not amount to saying that any evil action under certain circumstances 
can be done without sinning by whomever.
　 It seems therefore right to distinguish between good and evil as belonging to different levels 
of being, although not always perfectly distinct in real situations, as we will see.  The real good 
is something that, solely, has a positive quality for which it can (and indeed must) be desired, 
willed and loved, whereas an evil is only an object of the perverted cognition, driven by passion. 
This asymmetry can be seen from the fact that, traditionally, a doubt about whether an action is 
good makes that action non-obligatory, while a doubt about whether an action is or is not an 
evil one makes it straightforwardly impermissible.  The risk of coming near to the border of 
evil must be proportionate enough to be justified, which is usually an extraordinary situation, a 
limit-case, and weighing possible good and bad results so as to justify such a risk is an explicitly 
modern phenomenon.  In other words, good and evil are not just two parts of the same scale 
with a more or less clear boundary, and the question that some raise, whether what they do is 
still permissible or whether it is already a sin, is inherently mistaken.  Of course, there are 
interpretations of evil as a lack of good (Augustine) or as a degraded or misunderstood good 
(Aquinas), but I find it useful to recall in addition the terminology of the above-mentioned R. 
Guardini, who proposed a distinction between opposite (Gegensatz) and contrar y 
(Widerspruch).19  According to him, contraries such as good/evil are not two co-original 
principles in sense of a dualism, nor are they always mixed to a certain degree.  In contrast, a 
real evil done by a person does not contain a minimum of good in itself (as it would be the case 
with a pair of opposites such as conservation and creativity etc.).  Guardini strictly criticizes 
people who tried to bring good and evil into relation or to put them on the same level.  He used 
to call this approach “romanticism” that would have roots in gnostic dualism, for which evil is in 
some sense inevitable, has to be committed to a certain degree in every good action, or 
conversely by mixing them together the real distinction disappears and only good or only evil 
19 Cf. R. GUARDINI,  Der Gegensatz , 28;  Das Christusbild der paulinischen und johanneischen Schiften , 138 ― 139 (“ Dann aber 
gibt es andere, von diesen grundsätzlich verschiedene Antithesen.  Die Momente, die sich in ihnen gegenüberstehen, bilden 
keine Bestandteile eines übergeordneten Ganzen, sondern haben das echte Enweder-Oder [sic!] zwischen sich, und davon, 
wie dieses durchgeführt wird, hängt alles ab, was ’Charakter’ heißt.  Zwischen dem ja und dem Nein, zwischen dem Guten 
und dem Bösen gibt es weder ’Dialektik’ noch ’Synthese’, sondern nur die Entscheidung.  Sie synthetisch zu behandeln, 
macht geradezu die Unreinheit des Geistes aus.  Eine Grundgefahr der geschilderten Haltung besteht nun gerade in der 
Neigung, ’Widersprüche’ zu ’Gegensätzen’ zu machen und als notwendige Elemente des Daseinsganzen zu verstehen ”), 158; 
 Welt und Person , 50 (“ In Wahrheit ist aber das Böse kein Gegenpol zum Guten  ― ebenso wie das Nein zum ja, oder das 
Nichts zum Sein.  Das Gute ist das kategorisch Gültige und Seinsberechtigte; das Böse hingegen jenes, das unter keinen 
Umständen sein darf, wesentlich Un-Sinn bedeutet.  Sobald etwas ’Pol’ ist, wird der ’Gegenpol’ dialektisch notwendig; das 
Gute ist aber kein Pol und ruft keinen Gegenpol.  Das Gute ist das, was es geben soll; das Böse das, was es nicht geben darf 
und, im metaphysischen Sinne, nicht zu geben braucht; das schlechthin überflüssige ”);  Theologische Briefe an einen 
Freund , 51;  Ethik , 76 ― 77.
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in everything is left, while the counterpart is resolved into it.20  Dif ferently from various 
opposites (e.g. tradition and innovation) that are inherent in the living beings, good can really 
exist without evil ― its very contrary ― and does not need it as its complement or point of 
reference.  Most prominently, God in the Christian tradition is the source of the good only and 
evil has no place at all in God’s decisions, although He often prefers to tolerate it ― 
pedagogically ― while transforming it in the preparation for the final state of redemption.
　 It can be therefore said that something is not good simply because it is free from any evil, 
but lacking goodness even minimally defines an act as potentially bad.  But is it not also true 
that wanting to escape every single risk to commit an evil deprives the agent of precious 
occasions to do good, more good or at least some good? This I am going to consider in the next 
section.  It seems a common intuition that choosing an action with less harm or damage seems 
at certain occasions the “right” thing to do.  However, in what follows I shall argue that it is not 
equal to “decide to actively do evil only because it is less than some other one” and “consent to 
do some evil because it is the only way to achieve a necessary good”.  In other words, in order 
to engage in some evil there has to be no other option and the matter is not whether one can 
legitimately commit an evil act (in order to maximize the good), but how to reduce the evil that 
is going to arise anyway or that already has taken place.
2. Principle of the “lesser evil” and its origins
　 Although it is commonly known even among non-religious people or people without any 
concern for ethics as such, it is actually not so easy to find clear roots of this “principle”.  In 
fact, this entry is missing in many dictionaries of ethics or moral theology and many studies 
refer to it only marginally.21  As a possible reason for that, it can be argued that this axiom is 
either not a part of the traditional moral reasoning, or that it is probably too obvious to be 
20 ID.,  Wurzeln eines großen Lebenswerks , 366 ― 367 footnote.  Therefore, good and evil cannot  ― by definition  ― be brought 
to a higher dialectical synthesis but exclude one another completely and totally.
21 Pietro PALAZZINI, “Minor male”, in  Dizionario di Teologia Morale , Editrice Studium, 1969, etc. being its exceptions.  On 
the contrary,  Nuovo Dizionario di Teologia Morale , ed.  F. Compagnoni, G. Pianna, S. Privitera, Edizioni Paoline 1990 
does not mention it at all.  Among other studies dedicated to this topic, albeit not exclusively, the following is to be 
mentioned. J. SYTNIK-CZETWERTYŃSKI, D. CIANCIARA, “The problem of lesser evil within the context of public health,” 
 Journal of Education, Health and Sport Vol. 6 Nr. 10 (2016), 299 ― 308.  There, they point out (although without providing 
the correct quotation) that a fierce user of the phrase “lesser evil” was the infamous N. Machiavelli, who states in  The 
Prince ch. XXI “Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe courses; rather let it expect to have 
to take very doubtful ones, because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble without 
running into another; but  prudence consists in knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to 
take the lesser evil (quoted according to https://www.sparknotes. com/philosophy/prince/full-text/chapter-xxi/ 
[accessed 2 September 2020]).” The question is whether this applies to governmental policy-making and business 
strategies only or to any ethical conduct. Anyway, despite spurious reasoning, the authors arrive at similar conclusions 
to my own.
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mentioned.  It seems as if it were a kind of common intuition saying that, when you cannot help 
avoiding an evil action, choose at least the less damaging one among all the possibilities.  For 
example, there is a Latin proverb claiming that “De duobus malis, minus est semper eligendum.” 
But is it really only a negative formulation of the first principle of the practical reason “Good is 
to be done”? Can choosing a lesser evil be called a sort of good that can be actively and 
intentionally aimed at? And how can evils be measured and compared? Are we to reduce only 
evils that depend directly on us? It looks like a sort of practical wisdom, but on the other hand 
the application of this axiom remains often a theoretical one, since many dilemmatic situations 
are much more complex than choosing among two options of which both are clearly evil.
　 Indeed, it is not easy to find explicit references to this kind of principle or an academic 
exploration of its contents, especially in an explicitly moral-theological context.22  Historically, 
the roots of such a way of thinking can be found as early as in the canons of the Eighth Council 
of Toledo (AD 653), which states that “Est tamen quod ad destruendas versutias utiliter fiat, ut 
cum mens minori et maximo peccato constringitur, si omnino nullus sine peccato aditus evadendi 
patet, minora semper eligantur, quia et qui murorum ambitu ne fugiat, clauditur, ibi se in fugam 
praecipitat, ubi brevior murus invenitur.”23  Where is the problem? Needless to say, there is a 
striking shift in terminology in comparison to the original or perhaps the more common 
“malum vitandum est” of the natural law theory.24  In this case, indeed, we find an evil, a sinful 
action that is to be actively albeit regretfully “chosen” (eligendum) and decided for, because it is 
lesser than the other one, both of them being inevitable.  Of course, it is taken for granted that 
if there was another possibility that did not implicate sin, this would be absolutely preferable. 
However, we could argue that, if one is coerced to do something by force or necessity, it does 
not fulfill the conditions for committing a sin, hence, doing something involuntarily would not 
constitute a moral evil as such.  If humans really are in a state that they almost cannot perform 
virtuous actions, it is understandable that one prefers committing a venial sin (or more venial 
sins) than a mortal one, not because they are less serious or permissible but because they are 
of a different kind.  The situation treated here is clearly one of a dilemma, in which a person 
22 On the other hand, it is true that also Aristotle mentions “a lesser evil” almost as a part of common sense, calling it even 
a good under certain aspect, i.e. when a real good is not possible.  In ARISTOTLE,  Nicomachean Ethics , V, 1129b, 7 ― 8 and 
1131b, 20 ― 24 he claims that  is much more preferable than a bigger evil, but what is preferable and 
worthy of choice must be (also) some good and therefore the most preferable of all is the biggest good.
23 Concilium Toletanum Octavum, c. II, PL 130 0509D ― 0510A (quoted according to  Corpus corporum repositorium operum 
Latinorum apud universitatem Turicensem at http://mlat.uzh.ch/MLS/ [accessed 2 September 2020]; emphasis 
added).  As we will see later, this is a reference to St. Gregory and will be quoted by Gratian, therefore, the English 
translation can be found in sources given below in fn. 25 and 27.  What is being implied here is that if and only if the 
same soul is trapped between a greater and a smaller  sin so that it cannot escape sinning, it should always opt for the 
smaller one.  The analogy of the fugitive looking for a place in the wall to jump from also shows that not every 
supposedly “lower” place is automatically eligible for jumping, as it would risk one’s life.  Neither is it talking about 
evils that are not sins, i.e. physical evils and wrongdoing of others.
24 It seems to me that there is a big chance that what was considered originally eligible as an object of action under 
certain circumstances, has been later specified as tolerable, while remaining necessary to avoid if as far as possible.
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really stands in front of two unavoidable sinful actions ― and these have to be two real evils, as 
we will see later.  But how often do such situations occur in everyday life? Are people every 
now and then really coerced to choose between two or more sins, without having an option of 
not committing evil at all? One thing remains clear: the Council does not speak about reducing 
suffering but about avoiding a bigger sin, nor does it suggest in any way permitting a sin only 
so that some bigger good may be achieved through it.  And a faulty conclusion would be also to 
infer that the most basic task of moral life is to avoid mortal sins and to sin only venially.  There 
have been indeed times when avoiding (at least great sins) was considered a sufficient goal of 
Christian ethics instead of striving towards higher good.
　 Still another source, an earlier one, can be discovered in the work of Gregory the Great 
(540―604), Moralia in Iob.  It claims that “Est tamen quod ad destruendas eius versutias utiliter 
fiat, ut dum mens inter minora et maxima peccata constringitur, si omnino nullus sine peccato 
evadendi aditus patet, minora semper eligantur, quia et qui murorum undique ambitu ne fugiat 
clauditur, ibi se in fugam praecipitat, ubi brevior murus invenitur. [...] Sed cum in dubiis 
constringimur, utiliter minimis subdimur, ne in magnis sine venia peccemus.”25  In Gregory’s 
view, which is eminently pastoral, a person can tend towards perfection by avoiding great evils, 
in which one finds himself or herself trapped.  Opting for a less harmful or risky solution is 
reasonable and unavoidable, as his analogy with the fugitive’s choosing to jump from the lowest 
part of the wall shows.  Thus, Gregory’s text and the Council of Toledo share the same 
reasoning, the same language (eligantur), and sinful situations about which they speak are 
indeed very limited, and this rule can hardly become a generally valid principle.
　 The underlying idea behind these texts is practically the same: that the human agent should 
always avoid one own’s sins (not all evils) above all, and only if there is a real dilemma between 
two sinful actions that cannot be avoided at the same time, the person is sometimes held to 
accept the less damaging one in so far as it depends on her.  Nowhere is it claimed that an evil 
can or should be “prevented” from happening by “substituting” it with a less harmful 
alternative.  That is to say, the decision remains indeed sinful, but the only difference is that the 
person can in this case feel free to go for it with the hope of being pardoned, and the same act 
would be otherwise proscribed.  Without knowing that the lesser evil in that case is tolerable, 
the person might either remained trapped in the anxious dilemma, or feel restrained from any 
action, which in some cases could be the worst alternative of all.  Some would perhaps make 
the distinction between objectively and subjectively sinful acts on the one hand, and sinful yet 
non-culpable acts on the other, wherein the necessity of committing an act does not change the 
25  Moralia in Iob , XX, 32.6 (quoted according to http://monumenta.ch/latein/text.php?tabelle=Gregorius_ 
Magnus&rumpfid=Gregorius%20Magnus,%20Moralia%20in%20Iob,%2032,%20%20%2019&nf=1 [accessed 28 August 
2020]; emphasis added).  English translation: “There is, however, a plan which may be usefully adopted to overthrow 
his craft, namely, that  when the mind is held in bondage between less and greater sins, if no outlet for escape is open 
without sin, the less evils should always be preferred : because even he who is shut in by a circuit of walls on every 
side, lest he escape, there throws himself down in flight, where the wall is found lowest. [...] But when we are 
constrained by doubts, we profitably yield to the least, for fear of sinning unpardonably in great, faults” (quoted 
according to http://www.lectionarycentral.com/GregoryMoralia/Book32.html [accessed 28 August 2020]).
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moral quality of the act itself.  But in this case is there really “a choice” concerned for which 
one can be held responsible? Is it not better to say that a good of not sinning as much as 
physically possible, i.e. the good of growing in perfection, is intended rather? We can quite 
easily imagine how people in the Middle Ages were often obsessed by the thought of being 
damned only because of having sinned gravely, and therefore anything could or should be done 
in order to avoid a mortal sin first of all, even to the extent of preferring a venial one over it. 
There have been examples of people that would even prefer to lose their life unnecessarily in 
order to avoid committing a sin, maybe even if they would not have been technically held 
responsible for it.  But it should be also clear that a sin does not become something good or 
acceptable only because it is not (yet) mortal and calling it “less grave” should not mean 
agreeing with it, which is the risk inherent to the extreme opposite the medieval one.  On the 
other hand, it is also understandable that not distinguishing different kinds of sins could lead to 
an incorrect assumption, thinking that if all scenarios are sinful anyway, it does not really 
matter which one I choose.  Clearly, to use a favorite case in canonical texts, breaking an oath 
and preventing murder are not acts at the same level.  But rather than concluding that a 
promise can be broken under some circumstances, in many cases the canonist will follow the 
path of declaring a sin-involving oath non-binding.
　 Both above-mentioned sources found their way into the famous twelfth-century canonical 
work “Decretum Gratiani” that deals with resolving moral dilemmas26 that occur in the natural 
order as a result of the Devil’s attack.  Notice the shift from speaking pastorally about sin to 
dealing juridically with evildoing.  According to this text,
Item aduersus naturale ius nulla dispensatio admittitur; nisi forte duo mala ita urgeant ut alterum eorum 
necesse sit eligi. [...]
Duo mala, licet cautissime sint precauenda tamen si periculi necessitas unum ex his temperare compulerit, id 
debemus resoluere, quod minori nexu noscitur obligari.  Quid autem leuius ex his, quidue grauius sit, purae 
rationis acumine inuestigemus. [...]
Ut plerosque ita peccare faciant, quatenus si fortasse fugere peccatum appetant, hoc sine alio peccati laqueo 
non euadant, et culpam faciant dum uitant, atque nequaquam se ab una ualeant soluere, nisi in alia se 
consentiant ligare.
[...] ut cum mens inter minora et maxima peccata constringitur, si omnino nullus sine peccato aditus patet, 
minora semper eligantur, etc.
27
26 Cf. M. V. DOUGHERTY,  Moral dilemmas in medieval thought: from Gratian to Aquinas , Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2013 (especially p. 21ff.).  The author offers a splendid analysis of early medieval dilemmas as they appear 
in the text relevant to my study.  I feel greatly indebted to his elucidations.
27 Dist. XIII, c. 1 and 2, quoted according to the  Münchener DigitalisierungsZentrum (http://geschichte.digitale-
sammlungen.de/decretum-gratiani//seite/bsb00009126_00068 [accessed 18 August 2017]; emphasis added).  English 
translation: “No dispensation is permitted from natural law except perhaps when one is compelled to choose between 
two evils. [...] Although one must carefully guard against being forced to choose between two evils:  if an inescapable 
danger compels one to perpetrate one of two evils, we must choose the one that makes us less guilty .  We should 
investigate which of the two is less and which is more serious by the acuity of pure reason. [...] Thus, many commit 
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In other words, Gratian defends the view that there are situations of real perplexity in moral life 
and that in such an unideal case even the natural law admits certain dispensations, since 
nobody can be obliged to escape an unavoidable evil.  The reason why there seems to be such 
a disorder in the natural order, that otherwise is supposed to be reasonable and accomplishable 
(and only therefore obligatory), is the action of the Evil in person.  However, this point of view 
was not at all shared by his commentators.  On the contrary, the authors of so-called Glossa 
ordinaria are steadily criticizing their Master.28  In doing so, they act as brave jurists and do not 
keep in mind so much the pastoral aspect (as later Alphonsus de Liguori would do), hence their 
presupposition is that any state of perplexity is only epistemological and illusory, and there 
must be at least one non-evil solution (such as refraining from acting).  For those glossators, 
any dilemmatic case is always resolvable, and something like principle of lesser evil would be 
therefore superfluous.  Nevertheless, the opinion that, if possible or necessary, one has to 
diminish the evil effects of one’s own action became common in the Middle Ages, finding echo 
for example in the fifteen-century spiritual work De imitatione Christi of Thomas à Kempis.29 
Exemplarily, a good person is to be considered one who commits less (and not “no”) evil, as 
sins when, because they want to avoid one sin, they cannot escape the snare of another, and thus they commit one fault 
to avoid another.  They find no way to escape one sin without consenting to the other. [...] So,  when we are tom 
between dubious choices, we expediently submit to the lesser evil, lest we sin without indulgence by committing the 
greater ” (quoted according to  Gratian.  The Treatise on Laws with the Ordinary Gloss , Studies in Medieval and Early 
Modern Canon Law 2, transl.  A. Thompson and J. Gordley, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington 
D.C.: 1993, 48 ― 49).  In the text, note Gratian’s theoretical approach expressed in “forte” (perhaps, accidentally), and 
further the particular way of distinguishing between two evils “purae rationis acumine” (by the sharpness of pure 
reason).  That means that it is above all the concerned agent himself or herself to pond on the options he or she has 
and to distinguish which solution is a better and which is a worse one.
28 “[...] a dispensation is permitted from the other laws [...], but it is never permitted from the provisions of the natural law 
consisting of precepts and prohibitions.  The master makes one exception in the case of doubt, but he does so badly. [...] 
But it must be stated that no one can really be in doubt between two evils in this way.  For it would then follow that 
necessity can make one do something evil. [...] the person’s doubt cannot really arise from the matter itself, but it must arise 
in the mind and from foolish opinion” (quoted according to  Gratian.  The Treatise on Laws with the Ordinary Gloss , 48 ― 49).
29 “If you say that you cannot suffer much, how will you endure the fire of purgatory?  Of two evils, the lesser is always to 
be chosen. Therefore, in order that you may escape the everlasting punishments to come, try to bear present evils 
patiently for the sake of God” (III, 12, quoted according to http://www.ccel.org/ccel/kempis/ imitation.THREE.12.
html [accessed 17 August 2017], emphasis added).  However, there is another important passage that completes the 
view. “Never do evil for anything in the world, or for the love of any man.  For one who is in need, however, a good work 
may at times be purposely left undone or changed for a better one.  This is not the omission of a good deed but rather 
its improvement” (I, 15, §1, quoted according to http://www.ccel. org/ccel/kempis/imitation.ONE.15.html [accessed 
17 August 2017]).  One of the reasons for which humans cannot actively cooperate with evil is perhaps that it pertains 
only to God to change evil into good.  Be it as it may, it is clear that evils are to be endured rather than produced.  It is 
also evident that the author here compares physical (i.e. lesser) evils with punishable moral (i.e. greater) evils.
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Isidor of Seville (c. 560―636) would have put it.30  However, reducing any evil of others or 
obliging people to prevent harm at any cost are again not dealt with.
　 As for the Angelic Doctor, it is difficult to articulate his own positions, as the respective 
article on “cases of perplexity” is arguably missing.  However, we know that for him people do 
sometimes commit objectively wrong deeds without subjectively incurring guilt, as for example 
in the case of defending oneself while causing the death of the unjust aggressor, because killing 
a person was simply beyond the intention (praeter intentionem) of the agent.  Besides that, 
Aquinas treats this argument briefly when arguing about the right form of government and, in 
my view, the social order is exactly where compromises are done and where, accordingly, this 
so-called principle finds its actual and only application.  In his words, “Cum autem inter duo, ex 
quorum utroque periculum imminet, eligere oportet, illud potissime eligendum est ex quo sequitur 
minus malum.  Ex monarchia autem, si in tyrannidem convertatur, minus malum sequitur quam 
ex regimine plurium optimatum, quando corrumpitur”.31  It is noteworthy that he does not speak 
of choosing an actual evil, but an action or object from which a lesser evil would eventually 
follow as a consequence, comparing to other possible (similarly harmful) solutions, in this case 
autocracy vs. republican oligarchy.  Moreover, the nuance there is that a monarchy is 
potentially less dangerous, even if it can turn into tyranny, in comparison to a republic, which 
according to Aquinas will soon or later most probably turn into anarchy.  It is therefore not a 
question of choosing an actual evil of dictatorship because it brings a greater sum of benefits, 
but of preferring a solution whose results can be not good but nevertheless less evil than other 
alternatives.  But it has to be also said that monarchy for Thomas has a much bigger 
importance and meaning than only being a less evil alternative to anarchistic plutocracy and, in 
the end, it is not even the best political system for him either but rather a relatively better 
compromise.
　 In other words, something being a lesser evil (compared to something else) is still not a 
constitutive reason for adop
ting it as a solution straightforwardly.  Another issue connected with the political sphere would 
be the situation in which the official authority should point out and punish an evil, but instead 
prefers to overlook it because it might cause a greater evil when dealt with: either a negative 
30 “We call a person good if evil does not have the upper hand in him, and we call that person best ( optimus , superlative of 
 bonus ) who sins least” (quoted according to  The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville [X.B. 22], ed. Stephen A. BARNEY et al., 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 214).
31 Thomas AQUINAS,  De regno , lib. 1 cap. 6 (quoted according to  Corpus Thomisticum , http://www.corpusthomisticum.org 
[accessed 19 August 2017]; emphasis added).  English translation: “When a choice is to be made between two things, 
from both of which danger impends, surely that one should be chosen from which the lesser evil follows.  Now, lesser 
evil follows from the corruption of a monarchy (which is tyranny) than from the corruption of an aristocracy” (quoted 
according to https://aquinas.cc [accessed 23 June 2020]).  As mentioned above at fn. 13, it will be more a feature of the 
later probabilism, influenced by nominalism, visible for example as early as in F. de Vitoria, according to whom in 
“doubtful cases, we can follow the moral standard, namely that less evil should be chosen from two evils, but known 
evil should never be chosen” (idem, 741).  Note that, although it is meant to be a commentary on Aquinas, it is quite 
different in nuance from the original.
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example attracting still more evildoers, or a general confusion and disillusion.  In this case we 
could perhaps speak about accepting an evil state of things for the time being, in order not to 
create a greater harm, i.e. knowingly ignoring or overlooking rather than accepting it. 
Furthermore, while he admittedly uses this concept in his social doctrine, it is a question 
whether for Thomas there would have been something like preferring a potentially less 
harmful moral deed over a morally evil solution of an individual.  It is obviously another thing 
to argue about political systems (that have been proven good or bad in the past) and to reason 
about personal human acts, which are often unpredictable and unexplainable for any external 
observer.
　 That being said, it seems that for Thomas, as well as for the whole medieval tradition reaching 
back at least to the 12th century, there was a clear concept of “tolerance” especially in the realm 
of social order.32  In contrast to later interpretation, in the Middle Ages ― differently from how it 
sometimes tends to be imagined ― there was a general consensus on tolerating elements of the 
society whose existence was not desirable but whose eradication, on the other hand, would mean 
more of a disorder than benefit for the general society.  The underlying idea is that not all 
deviations can be corrected at the same time and therefore the greater evils such as theft or 
murder should be dealt with first.  In particular sense, groups that were meant as objects of this 
attitude of tolerance were either the marginal members of the predominantly Christian society, 
such as the Jews and Muslims, and further the sinners ― above all the prostitutes.  Conversely, 
people like heretics were the insiders and their presence meant more a risk for the well-being of 
all rather than something that could be beneficial or tolerated.  It is quite understandable that a 
lenient approach to eradicating evil in various forms can indeed be profitable for the society (as 
in the case of unlawful money-lending permitted to the Jews), but at the same time a community 
has to tend to a higher ideal, even if it is apparently unattainable.  Be it as it may, that prostitution 
was tolerated (if not actively promoted) as a remedy for worse sexual perversions is quite an 
extreme and striking application of this principle.  And, in fact, some one hundred years later 
thinkers like Erasmus were not so benevolent anymore toward any social phenomenon that is 
evil but could or should be tolerated for the sake of a greater good (such as stability and 
harmony in society).  In one word, what was needed and what has been needed ever since is the 
aptitude to distinguish between an evil act and the evildoer, i.e. to point out critically the evil 
phenomenon but to treat sinners with patience and mercy.  This required a capacity to maintain 
the tension and balance between aforementioned extremes.  It should not be also misunderstood 
that tolerating an evil equaled approving it: rather, as Raymond of Peñafort would have put it in 
the early 13th century, tolerance was a kind of permission (permissio comparativa)33 that does not 
excuse from sin but is in a certain sense necessary or wishful in order to avoid greater evil 
without, however, distinguishing between dif ferent kinds of evils yet.  The role of a wise 
Renaissance ruler consisted therefore not only in allowing various groups of people to live 
peacefully next to each other, but also in educating and guiding the subordinates towards a 
32 I. BEJCZY, “Tolerantia: A Medieval Concept,”  Journal of the History of Ideas , vol. 58, No. 3 (July 1997), pp. 365 ― 384.  I am 
relying heavily on his analysis in this paragraph.
33 Ibid., pp. 369 ― 370.
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better moral state.  Now, putting political theory or social order aside, what does it look like with 
a more narrowly considered moral reasoning and assessment of concrete human acts?
　 The problematic part of this traditional “lesser-evil reasoning” is that saying things in such a 
simple way as this so-called principle does, almost as if the two evils concerned were always 
equal ones between which to choose, fails to distinguish between various possible situations 
and treats the evils at stake as only different in degree.  Furthermore, it is known that in a state 
of psychological commotion, people tend to reduce the possible solutions to the two most 
extreme ones.  Therefore, it can be easily imagined that choosing a lesser evil does not have to 
be only an escape from an intricate dilemmatic situation but also a kind of self-justification 
mechanism.  It can be used as a salvation from perplexity as well as misused for indulging in 
one’s imperfect way of acting. E. Sgreccia34, a prominent Catholic bioethicist, rightly points out 
that the “principle” of lesser evil is only applicable in the case when we confront two physical 
evils ― because their cause lies outside of us.  Accordingly, in the case of any inevitable physical 
evil, it would be at least our right, if not our duty, to do everything in order to diminish its 
effects ― especially when it concerns ourselves or others directly entrusted to us.  However, 
this would not be the case if one were to face two evils of a different kind or evil of another 
agent.35  A typical case would be a situation when one is forced by a madman to kill one person 
just to avoid him killing some more people.  Strictly speaking, refusing to kill a person does not 
make one responsible for other people being killed instead, which would be and remain only a 
sin of another person.  In Sgreccia’s words:
Situations of conflict involving a choice between two evils ― including acts of omission ― cannot be 
generalized because we are not obligated to fulfill all duties simultaneously. [...] It is (therefore) important 
to find a principle of priority of hierarchy by which to clarify such situations.  We are first of all aided by a 
distinction that allows for an initial determination of precedence and hierarchy: the distinction between 
physical and moral evil. [...] ... when there is a conflict in a serious decision between a physical or material 
harm and a moral one, there is no doubt that the material good or goods must be sacrificed. [...] When 
faced with the alternative of committing moral evil, physical life itself is objectively deemed a justified 
sacrifice (martyrdom). [...] When there is a question of two moral evils, the obligation is to refuse both, 
because evil can never be the object of a choice.  This is also true even when a greater evil is brought 
about as a consequence of refusing the one that appears to be a lesser evil. [...]
Then there is a possibility of being forced to choose between (and therefore undergo) one of two physical 
evils, one lesser and one greater.  The guideline is clearly that one can and should normally prefer the 
34 E. SGRECCIA,  Personalist Bioethics. Foundations and Applications , vol. 1, transl. J. A. Di Camillo  ― M. J. Miller, The 
National Catholic Bioethics Center: Philadelphia 2012 (orig. 2007), pp. 189 ― 190.  To put it differently, Sgreccia is 
admitting that there is indeed such a thing as “lesser evil”, but it is in fact always only the physical evil compared with 
moral evils.
35 The idea that it is possible to substitute one’s own venial sin for another’s mortal sin is discussed and refuted in the 
distinction XIV of  Decretum Gratiani immediately following the text discussed above at fn. 27. Cf.  Gratian.  The Treatise 
on Laws with the Ordinary Gloss , 52 ― 53.  This time Gratian himself admits that the example of Lot in Gen 19: 7, who 
gave his daughters to prostitution so as to evade worse crimes of others, is not to be followed because this way of 
action was based on Lot’s emotions and not his rational decision in accordance with God’s will.
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lesser physical evil, whether it pertains to others or to oneself.  There may be cases, however, in which a 
subject can legitimately choose a greater physical evil in view of a reasonable and proportionate motive of 
a higher order.36
　 A completely different case would be opting intentionally for a sinful action just in order to 
avoid a future evil that will be arguably greater than the first one.  In Sgreccia’s view, it is illicit 
because it compares a present real evil/sin with a future probable or hypothetical evil/sin ― as 
for example in the case of a physician prescribing hormonal contraception because it is supposed 
to avoid undesired pregnancies that would then possibly lead to abortion which is a greater evil. 
The only licit situation would thus be choosing to avoid a greater physical evil that is just about to 
arise (such as a problematic pregnancy), by diminishing it through a choice of a lesser physical 
evil, but not cooperating actively in a moral evil (or at most only indirectly and materially).  Even 
a physical evil is regretful and originally should have not been necessary, therefore there is a 
right or perhaps even a supererogator y duty to reduce it, anticipating thus the future 
accomplishment of redemption rather than enduring it for now.  This is in the present state 
possible only to a limited extent though.37  The problem consists in human affectivity that does 
not always succeed in tolerating any evil at all and tends to reduce every choice to an either―or 
pattern.  Indeed, in many real situations, we easily recognize a false conflict between two 
solutions ― both of them objectively evil ― letting escape other possible scenarios.  It is also true 
that we often fabricate hypothetical evil choices in comparison with which our intended evil 
solutions seem less harmful.  But isn’t it an illusion to think that I have to act in some way or 
other (at any cost?) always, in every situation? Of course, not doing anything can in some cases 
be itself an evil choice too, but not necessarily.  The task is performed by the conscience aided 
by the virtue of prudence, and we also know very well that the freedom from constraints to 
choose among acts can be limited, e.g. by emotions, hormonal reactions, fear, customs etc.38 We 
36 E. SGRECCIA,  Personalist Bioethics. Foundations and Application , loc. cit. (emphasis added).
37 It is worth mentioning at this point, that evil should be considered a “mystery” rather than a “problem”, if one would 
apply the terminology of G. Marcel and others. Evil can be described but not analyzed, can be explained but not 
resolved by means of science, which always tends to getting rid of it from the life at any cost. Cf. G. MARCEL,  Being and 
Having , transl.  Katharine Farrer, Dacre Press: Westminster, 1949, pp. 100 ― 101.  Needless to say, mystery here does 
not want to say that the cause of the evil is just unknown, unknowable or a riddle, but moreover that it is not definable 
with one rational sentence.
38 Formerly the imperfection of the will as a part of the fallen nature was used to explain and excuse the evil choices. 
Nowadays, we can add also pieces of information offered by neuroscience, according to which much of human 
behavior is but a reaction, caused by neurochemical processes, or learned through stimuli from the environment.  In 
any case, unless we claim that everything in us is just programmed, this knowledge is also a liberating one, because 
the full responsibility for choosing imperfect goods does not lie on us only.  Expecting freedom to be an absolute 
absence of constraints or inclinations  ― an idea that supposedly started with Ockham  ― is highly questionable especially 
nowadays, in an age when algorithms silently decide what we are pretending to want and to choose freely.  However, to 
negate any freedom just on grounds that it is not perfect is equally a modern notion and the reality is a much more 
complex and paradoxical one.
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can only decide as freely as possible in our concrete situation.  In any case, evils that are being 
compared have to be of the same sort or level.  It can be true that some dangers are really 
likely to happen and that some threats are likely to arise, however deciding for an actual, real 
or present evil cannot outweigh a possible, future or hypothetical evil.  Even some objectively 
wrong actions such as killing of the aggressor used to be traditionally (only) tolerated and 
justified, rather than permitted/allowed (let alone actively promoted), to the extent as they 
were not preventing the attack but rather reacting to a danger already in act.39  Interestingly 
enough, the death penalty, which formerly used to be considered a regretful yet necessary evil 
means (a kind of collective self-defense?) for protecting in some cases the well-being of the 
society, has seen a radical development in official Catholic understanding, and from being 
considered limited and exceptional arrived recently at being deemed a grave violation of human 
dignity of the perpetrator.
　 In this first part, we had a look at different definitions and interpretations of evil and at how 
the interest in it has changed during the ages.  Further, I have tried to dig into the roots of the 
so-called principle or axiom of “lesser evil”, showing there are not many sources in the history 
of moral thought for this principle, that the linguistic usage shifted with time and that, even if 
admitted to a certain extent, it was not necessarily interpreted in the (simplistic) way it tends to 
be in later periods.  In the following part I will continue to trace this axiom in modernity, and I 
will present its most exemplary and excessive (mis)interpretations as well as points of their 
critique.  Finally, I will conclude with my own understanding of this principle, showing when 
and how it can be used, which as we will see is in fact only in a very limited context.
39 Permitting (or rather allowing in the sense of not doing anything against) is here contrasted with preventing in the 
literal sense of doing something in order to stop a cause from bringing about its effects.  It is usually antecedent to the 
bad event, but it can be also consequent to it.  What I am arguing here is that the former one is not legitimate, while as 
Cavanaugh points out the latter one can be foregone (T. A. CAVANAUGH,  Double-Ef fect Reasoning .  Doing Good and 
Avoiding Evil , Oxford Studies in Theological Ethics, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2006, pp. 167 ― 168).
